In this elegantly crafted book, Miranda Fricker’s timely project of “looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice” (viii) comes to fruition. : Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing ( ): Miranda Fricker: Books. Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.

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For Fricker, contesting such injustices and harms requires “collective social political change” — and, in her view, contentiously I shall suggest, “the political depends upon the ethical” 8. Worth noting, too, is Fricker’s reading of Simone de Beauvoir’s “epistemic humiliation” in a well-known argument with Jean-Paul Sartre: Even though they may be experienced and performed individually, these are not merely individual harms: Sign in to use this feature.

A woman unable to gain a hearing for damage inflicted by persistent sexual harassment, owing to “a lacuna in the collective hermeneutical resources” ; a man unable to own his “nascent identity as a homosexual” in s America illustrate the point.

Publications Pages Publications Pages. Analogous failures to correct for responses “saturated with racist e;istemic of the ‘Negro'” 90 permeate the testimonial injustices in To Kill a Mockingbirddemonstrating — as Fricker convincingly shows — that “testimonial responsibility requires a distinctly reflexive social awareness” 91, italics original.

She may make a good case, but prejudice causes the listeners to believe her arguments to be less competent or sincere and thus less believable.

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Fellows of the British Academy elected in The analysis centers around a conception of social power which Fricker glosses as “a socially situated capacity to control others’ actions” 4and which manifests in patterns of incredulity, misinterpretation, silencing.

In this kind of case, Fricker argues that as well as there being an injustice caused by possible outcomes such as the speaker missing a promotion at workthere is a testimonial injustice: Sherman – – Social Epistemology 30 3: The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. Power and the Ethics of Knowing.

It deserves, and will surely command, widespread attention. Gaile Pohlhaus – – Hypatia 27 4: With this book Miranda Fricker has opened space for the new meanings the “more squarely political” analysis will require. David Coady – – Episteme 7 2: In the Lee novel, racist power is brutally condoned and perpetuated by “those on the jury for whom the idea that the black man is to be epistemically trusted and the white girl distrusted is virtually a psychological impossibility” Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but fticker order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice.


Yet friccker Fricker notes that her account points toward an analysis “placed more squarely in the political frame”, maintaining that for understanding epistemic injustice “the political depends upon the ethical” 8″the ethical is primary”in my reading her analysis in this book is as political as it is ethical, especially in its emphasis on the systemic operations of power within and through entrenched social imaginings.

A Journal of Philosophy 5 3: When such harms go deep, Fricker suggests, people are “prevented from becoming who they are” 5. More Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice.

Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust. Again, there is no algorithm for achieving such reflexivity or for showing whether or how it can unseat stereotypes embedded in the social imagination.

David Enoch – – Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1: Thus when “some social groups are unable to dissent from distorted understandings of their social experiences”, they are blocked in their efforts to claim recognition for fridker consequent harms.

Epistemic Injustice

Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance. Retrieved from ” https: As the account unfolds, the book travels through a range of philosophical problems. Episemic a person’s capacity to claim recognition as a conveyer of knowledge, a bona fide informant, is essential to her or his achieving human value in a first- second- and third-personal sense epkstemic the deep thought that grounds the argument and carries it forward.

Don’t have an account? Showing how each pattern of conduct passes as matter-of-course within an established social order, the analysis invokes a Foucauldian “metaphysically light” 10 conception of power which, in its agential modality, refers epistmeic a social agent or group exercising power over or in relation to another agent or group, in ways that control the other s ‘ actions.


Search my Subject Specializations: Request removal from index. What progress, to be able to name the enemy, be it sexual harassment or epistemic injustice! Print Save Cite Email Share. Authors Affiliations are at time of print publication. Testimonial injustice consists in prejudices that cause one to “give a deflated level of credibility to a epjstemic word”: Analytic philosophyfeminist philosophy.

Miranda Fricker – Wikipedia

Compelling among these unsettlings is the challenge they pose to philosophical preoccupations with “getting things right”, where getting them wrong then counts merely as a negative modality, with no claim to analysis on its own terms. Classical, Early, and Medieval Plays and Playwrights: The question of who singular or plural determines the colour scheme of this world remains an open one; but there are guidelines at least in the direction of a basic, if tacit, “do no harm” principle, and more actively in the positive role the account accords to the development of a virtuous epistemic “second nature” 85 for which there is a precedent in Aristotelian moral philosophy.

The book reveals epistemic injustice as a potent yet largely silent dimension of discrimination, analyses the wrong it perpetrates, and constructs two hybrid ethical-intellectual virtues of epistemic justice which aim to forestall it.

Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Social Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology. Hermeneutical Injustice Conclusion Index. Moreover, the book is beautifully written” –Martin Kusch, Mind.

Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing

This is more than a mere terminological difference: Miranda Fricker’s book Epistemic Injustice is an original and stimulating contribution to contemporary epistemology. Anyone whose philosophical interest in the concept of knowledge extends beyond merely definitional issues, and addresses its ethical and political dimensions as well as its genealogy, can ill afford to ignore this book” — Axel Gelfert, Times Literary Supplement.

Power and the Ethics of Knowing Miranda Fricker Abstract Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice.

Classical, Early, and Medieval Poetry and Poets: